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C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 000581

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [CG](#)

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR POST INPUT ON GWOT ASSESSMENT

REF: SECSTATE 60775

Classified By: Poloff Gons Nachman for Reasons 1.4 B and D

1. (C) Although there is no evidence of current terrorist activity in the DRC, factors that could increase future risks include widespread corruption, lack of effective government authority around the country, weak state institutions, and abundant mineral resources including uranium. The areas outlined below represent Post's assessments of the counterterrorism needs for the Congo.

Airport and Border Security

2. (C) The main airport in the Congo is Ndjili Airport in Kinshasa. This facility is in dismal condition (i.e. even the x-ray machine rarely works), and immigration and customs officers are poorly trained and easily influenced. Additionally, the country has 54 border posts, some of which are manned on a part-time basis while others are not manned at all. In many areas of the country, such as Ituri, the border is completely porous and armed groups engage in international arms trafficking.

3. (C) Congolese immigration and customs officials would benefit from greater training on border protection including document fraud, terrorism indicators, and recruitment of informants. The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Gaborone would be one option, an INL program could be another.

Money Laundering

4. (U) Although the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is not a regional financial center, its porous borders, lack of a well-regulated banking sector and functional judicial system, and inadequate enforcement resources make it susceptible to money laundering. Smuggling is widespread throughout the DRC, and money laundering often involves the proceeds from illicit import/export activities and diamond sales. Money laundering also is prevalent in the money transfer agencies in the DRC and their associated exchange facilities. Most economic activity in the DRC takes place in the informal sector, estimated to be at least four times the size of the formal sector, with most transactions, even those of legitimate businesses, carried out in cash.

5. (C) There is a large Lebanese community heavily involved in the rough diamond trade, money transfer agencies, and export/import activities. Indo-Pakistani Muslims are also involved in export/import and banking activities. It is unclear to what extent those activities might support money laundering and/or terrorist finance of groups such as Hizbollah or Al Qaeda.

6. (C) The Congolese government is attempting to improve banking security. With the assistance of the World Bank, the Congolese Central Bank and the IMF, the GDRC recently passed legislation criminalizing money laundering. Banks and non-banking financial institutions are now required to report all transactions over \$10,000. Several insolvent banks have been liquidated. New computerized communications and accounting networks are to be installed to increase traceability of formal financial transactions. The GDRC, however, lacks the training, resources and expertise to effectively enforce the new legislation criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing. The country needs assistance in developing a viable anti-money laundering agency within the law enforcement branch of its government. Treasury's financial crimes unit program could be useful in this regard.

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